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FEDERAL COURT INTERPRETATION OF THE WASHINGTON
OBSCENITY STATUTE-Brockett v. Spokane Arcades, Inc., 105 S.
Ct. 2794 (1985).
The states bear the primary responsibility for the sexual morality of the
public1 and therefore have a legitimate interest in the regulation of commer-
cial obscenity. 2 The federal judiciary, however, bears the primary burden
for ensuring that such regulation does not violate the first amendment of the
United States Constitution. 3 This allocation of duties necessarily creates
the potential for conflict between state governments and federal courts.
Federal courts often seek means of avoiding such friction, especially when
the conflict involves strong state interests.4
Courts may employ three devices to deal with the state regulatory-federal
constitutional conflict, but only two minimize the friction between the state
government and the federal court. The alternatives available to a federal
court seeking to determine a threshold question of state law in a federal
constitutional case are: (1) speculation as to what the state court would
decide on the issue; (2) abstention until the parties can bring the issue
before the state courts; and (3) certification directly to the state supreme
court for a decision on the issue, where state courts provide for it. Specula-
tion, of course, cannot ease tensions concerning the overlapping interests.
Of the two more diplomatic solutions, certification provides the more
efficient solution.
A recent series of federal court decisions regarding an obscenity statute
in the State of Washington provides an example of the context in which the
state-federal conflict arises and the impact of the use of the various
alternatives. In Brockett v. Spokane Arcades, Inc.,5 the federal district
court, the Ninth Circuit, and the Supreme Court ignored the efficient
procedural solution of certification, and rejected the more time-consuming
abstention as well. The question before the court involved the definition of
obscenity. By refusing to allow the Washington Supreme Court to interpret
the word "lust" for purposes of the state's newly enacted moral nuisance
statute, the United States Supreme Court needlessly risked a constitutional
1. Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 502, 504 (1957) (Harlan, J., concurring).
2. Millerv. California, 413 U.S. 15, 18-19(1973). See Paris AdultTheatreI v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49,
57 (1973).
3. See Lake Carriers' Ass'n v. MacMullan, 406 U.S. 498, 509-10 (1972); McNeese v. Board of
Educ., 373 U.S. 668, 672-74 (1963); Wells, Preliminary Injunctions andAbstention: Some Problems
in Federalism, 63 CORNELL L. REv. 65, 66 (1977).
4. See Reetz v. Bozanich, 397 U.S. 82, 87 (1970).
5. 105 S. Ct. 2794 (1985).
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adjudication based on an erroneous interpretation of state law. The thresh-
old question of state law presented in Brockett could have been easily and
efficiently resolved by certifying the question of the proper interpretation
of the word "lust" to the Washington Supreme Court. Although certifica-
tion best facilitates the interpretation of unclear state law in federal consti-
tutional cases such as Brockett, the procedure can be improved to encour-
age its use in first amendment cases.
I. STRANGE BEDFELLOWS: STATE OBSCENITY
REGULATIONS AND THE FEDERAL COURTS
Traditionally, the federal courts litigate the constitutionality of state
obscenity regulations. 6 Plaintiffs believe that the independence and na-
tional outlook of federal judges make them more sensitive to federal rights
than state judges. 7 Plaintiffs claiming that state obscenity regulations
violate the first amendment, therefore, typically initiate actions in a federal
forum. 8 However, since states claim the area of sexual morality as their
preeminent domain, 9 federal courts often hesitate to interfere with state
legislation designed to protect that morality.10 This hesitation increases
when the state courts have not yet construed the legislation, and the issue
involves strong state interests. II
A. State Law in Federal Court
When a federal court litigates a case involving a federal constitutional
question with a threshold question of unclear state law, 12 the presiding
judges must first decide how the state's highest court would rule on the state
law issues. 13 Normally, the federal court will decide the state law issues
itself, relying on authoritative state court holdings to indicate how the
issues would have been determined if the case had been brought in the state
6. F. SCHAUER, THE LAW OF OBSCENITY 226 (1976).
7. Wells, supra note 3, at 75. See Neuborne, The Myth of Parity, 90 HARv. L. REV. 1105 (1977).
8. F. SCHAUER, supra note 6, at 226.
9. See Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 502 (1957) (Harlan, J., concurring).
10. Id.; see also United States v. 12 200-ft. Reels of Super 8mm. Film, 413 U.S. 123, 130 n.7
(1973).
11. See Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. 87, 113 (1974) (the construction of state obscenity
regulation must be left to the state courts) (quoting United States v. 12 200-ft. Reels of Super 8mm.
Film, 413 U.S. at 130 n.7).
12. An example of such a case is Brockett v. Spokane Arcades, Inc., 105 S. Ct. 2794 (1985). See
infra note 57.
13. Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938).
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court. 14 This process allows the federal litigation to proceed uninterrupted
and without added delay. 15 When a federal court invalidates a statute based
on an erroneous interpretation, the state must enact new legislation in order
to implement its objectives. 16 If the federal court incorrectly interprets the
statute and yet upholds it, the state must still bring a new action in the state
court to establish the proper interpretation of the statute. 17 Thus, since state
courts ultimately determine the meaning of their own law, a federal court
that construes a state statute in ruling on its constitutionality runs the risk
that a later contrary state court interpretation will undermine its holdings. 18
In order to avoid deciding unresolved state law issues themselves, federal
courts could instead either abstain on the state law issues19 or certify
questions of state law to the state supreme court. 20
In recent years, the Supreme Court has abstained from exercising its
jurisdiction in conflicts between state regulatory interests and federal
constitutional rights. 21 In these cases, the Court has followed Railroad
Commission v. Pullman Co. 22 and stayed its proceedings until the state
court system had resolved the unclear issue of state law. By abstaining, a
federal court forces the plaintiff to commence a new lawsuit in the state trial
court to resolve the unclear issues of state law. 23 The parties must work their
way through the state appellate system until the state supreme court
resolves the state law issue.24 If the state law questions are not dispositive of
14. 19 C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & E. COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE § 4507, at 91-94
(1982) [hereinafter WRIGHT & MILLER].
15. See Lehman Bros. v. Schein, 416 U.S. 386,394 (1974) (Rehnquist, J., concurring) (a decision
of the state law questions by the federal court entails less delay and expense than certification or
abstention).
16. R. MNOOKIN, IN THE INTEREST OF CHILDREN: ADVOCACY, LAW REFORM, AND PUBLIC POLICY 28
(1985).
17. Wells, supra note 3, at 71.
18. M. REDISH, FEDERAL JURISDICTION: TENSIONS IN THE ALLOCATION OF JUDICIAL POWER 234-35
(1980). See also IA J. MOORE, B. RINGLE & J. WICKER, MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE 309[2], at 3123
n. 19 (2d ed. 1985) [hereinafter MOORE]; Field, Abstention in Constitutional Cases: The Scope of the
Pullman Abstention Doctrine, 122 U. PA. L. REv. 1071, 1091 (1974); Wright, The Federal Courts and
the Nature and Quality of State Law, 13 WAYNE L. REV. 317, 322 (1967).
19. In this Note, the term "abstention" refers to the federal court action of remitting a case to the
state court for resolution of the state law issues, in the hope that a federal constitutional decision will be
avoided. See Railroad Comm'n v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496 (1941).
20. See, e.g., WASH. REV. CODE § 2.60.010-.900 (1985).
21. See, e.g., Babbitt v. United Farm Workers Nat'l Union, 442 U.S. 289 (1979) (ordering
abstention in suit challenging the constitutionality of Arizona farm labor statute); Reetz v. Bozanich,
397 U.S. 82 (1970) (ordering abstention in suit challenging the constitutionality of Alaska fishing laws
and regulations); see also Red Bluff Drive-In, Inc. v. Vance, 648 F.2d 1020, 1035 (5th Cir. 1981).
22. 312 U.S. 496 (1941).
23. Field, The Abstention Doctrine Today, 125 U. PA. L. REv. 590, 591 (1977); Lillich & Mundy,
Federal Court Certification ofDoubtful State Law Questions, 18 UCLA L. REV. 888, 890 n.22 (1971).
24. Field, supra note 23, at 591; Lillich & Mundy, supra note 23, at 890 n.22.
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the controversy, the litigants may then return to the federal forum to resolve
the federal issues. 25 By allowing the state courts to rule on the state law
issues before adjudication of the federal constitutional issues, Pullman
abstention mimimizes conflicts between the state and federal systems 26 and
avoids unnecessary adjudication of constitutional questions. 2 7
Because of the potential for burdening litigants with extended delay and
added expense, 28 however, federal courts should regard abstention as a
narrow exception to their general duty to decide cases properly brought
before them. 29 Courts can justify abstaining only in exceptional circum-
25. Field, supra note 23, at 591. See England v. Louisiana State Bd. of Medical Examiners, 375
U.S. 411 (1964). If the litigants unreservedly submit their federal claims for adjudication along with
their state claims, the litigants are bound by the decision of the state court on both sets of issues; only the
United States Supreme Court can then overturn the state court decision. Id. at 417-19. See NAACP v.
Button, 371 U.S. 415, 427 (1963). If either party expressly reserves the right to return to the federal
forum, however, the parties return to the federal court for decision on the federal issues after the state
court has acted on the state law issues. England, 375 U.S. at 422; 17 WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 14,
§ 4243, at 478-79. The federal court, in most instances, retains jurisdiction of the case while the parties
seek an authoritative pronouncement of the state law issues in the state courts. Field, supra note 23, at
590. See American Trial Lawyers Ass'n v. New Jersey Supreme Court, 409 U.S. 467 (1973). Retaining
jurisdiction allows the federal court to grant interim relief to protect the parties during the period of
abstention. 17 WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 14, § 4243, at 473.
26. Babbitt v. United Farm Workers Nat'l Union, 442 U.S. 289, 306 (1979); Railroad Comm'n v.
Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496,500 (1941); Quilici v. Village of Morton Grove, 695 F.2d 261,265 n.2 (7th
Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 863 (1983).
27. Harman v. Forssenius, 380 U.S. 528, 534 (1965); Field, supra note 23. at 590-91. Courts
refrain from deciding cases on constitutional grounds whenever possible. See Spector Motor Serv., Inc.
v. McLaughlin, 323 U.S. 101 (1944); Burton v. United States, 196 U.S. 283 (1905). Constitutional
adjudication creates tension between the judicial and legislative roles of government because while the
legislature can overrule a court's interpretation of a statute by clarifying statutory language, it cannot
revive in full a statute that a court has found unconstitutional. See R. MNOOKIN, supra note 16, at 28.
The policy of avoiding unneccessary constitutional adjudication is not absolute, however. Field,
supra note 18, at 1097. A court may decline to heed the policy for "important reasons." Siler v.
Louisville & Nashville R.R., 213 U.S. 175, 193 (1909). For a discussion of the effect of the "important
reasons" exception upon Pullman abstention, see Field, supra note 18, at 1097.
28. Abstention results in an independent adjudication in the state judicial system. Lillich &
Mundy, supra note 23, at 890 n.22. See England v. Louisiana State Bd. of Medical Examiners, 375
U.S. 411 (1964). Pullman abstention has led to delays of many years in some cases. E.g., England v.
Louisiana State Bd. of Medical Examiners, 384 U.S. 885 (1966) (five years); Spector Motor Serv., Inc.
v. O'Connor, 340 U.S. 602 (1951) (seven years); see also United States v. Leiter Minerals, Inc., 381
U.S. 413 (1965) (dismissed as moot eight years after abstention ordered).
29. Colorado River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800, 813 (1976).
Although parties possess no absolute right to federal jurisdiction, Mottolesev. Kaufman, 176 F.2d 301,
302-03 (2d Cir. 1949), Congress has imposed upon federal courts the duty "to give due respect" to
litigants' choice of the federal forum for the decision of their constitutional claims. Zwickler v. Koota,
389 U.S. 241, 248 (1967). Escape from that duty is sanctioned only in narrowly limited "special
circumstances." Id. (citing Propper v. Clark, 337 U.S. 472, 492 (1949)). See also Colorado River
Water Conservation Dist., 424 U.S. at 817 (noting "the virtually unflagging obligation of the federal
courts to exercise the jurisdiction given them"); Hicks v. Miranda, 422 U.S. 332, 355 (1975) (Stewart,
J., dissenting). But see City of Chicago v. Fieldcrest Dairies, Inc., 316 U.S. 168, 172-73 (1942)
("Considerations of delay, inconvenience, and cost to the parties, which have been urged upon us, do
not call for a different result. For we are here concerned with the much larger issue as to the appropriate
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stances where the order to the parties to commence litigation in the state
court serves important countervailing interests. 30
Courts have been particularly hesitant to abstain when the resulting delay
might undermine fundamental constitutional guarantees. 31 Delay may be
especially harmful in cases involving a first amendment challenge, since
postponing the ultimate determination of the constitutional question will
likely inhibit the exercise of the very constitutional right for which the
plaintiff seeks protection. 32 Thus, federal courts have usually found absten-
tion inappropriate when a plaintiff attacks a state statute on its face for
deterring constitutionally protected expression. 33
In twenty-five states,34 a federal court may refer certified questions of
relationship between federal and state authorities functioning as a harmonious whole.").
30. Kusperv. Pontikes, 414 U.S. 51,54 (1973); Lake Carriers' Ass'nv. MacMullan, 406 U.S. 498,
509 (1972); Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56, 62 n.5 (1972); County of Allegheny v. Frank Mashuda
Co., 360 U.S. 185, 188-89 (1959).
31. While courts recognize no per se civil rights exception to the abstention doctrine, the Supreme
Court has demonstrated a reluctance to order abstention in cases involving certain civil rights claims.
C-Y Dev. Co. v. City of Redlands, 703 F.2d 375, 381 (9th Cir. 1983); see 17 WIGrr & MILER, suprla
note 14, § 4242, at 465-67. Butsee Harrison v. NAACP, 360 U.S. 167 (1959) (holding that state voting
rights enactments should be exposed to state construction before federal courts determine their
constitutionality); Lewellyn v. Gerhardt, 513 F.2d 184, 187 (7th Cir. 1975) (finding abstention appropri-
ate where unsettled questions of state law regarding the constitutionality of a reverter clause may
dispose of the federal constitutional issues of due process and equal protection presented); Romero v.
Coldwell, 455 F.2d 1163, 1167 (5th Cir. 1972) (abstaining when clarification by state courts might
obviate the need for federal constitutional litigation on the issue of state voting rights); Field, supra note
18, at 1131-32 (virtually all constitutional challenges can be brought under the Civil Rights Act).
32. Vance v. Universal Amusement Co., 445 U.S. 308, 311 (1980) (requiring "a special analysis
when the prohibited future conduct may be protected by the First Amendment"); Procunier v. Martinez,
416 U.S. 396, 404 (1974); Zwickler v. Koota, 389 U.S. 241, 252 (1967); Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380
U.S. 479, 489-90, 492 (1965); Baggett v. Bullitt, 377 U.S. 360, 378-79 (1964). But see Harrison v.
NAACP, 360 U.S. 167, 178 (1959) (federal judgment regarding state voting statute should be based on a
complete product of the state, the enactment as phrased by its legislature and as construed by the state
supreme court).
33. Zwickler v. Koota, 389 U.S. 241,254 (1967); Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479,486-87
(1965); Baggett v. Bullitt, 377 U.S. 360, 378-79 (1964); NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415,433 (1963).
But see Zwickler, 389 U.S. at 257 (Harlan, J., concurring in judgment).
34. C. WRIGHT, THE LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS 52 (3d ed. 1976); 17 WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note
14, § 4248, at 525.
In the State of Washington, the Federal Court Local Law Certificate Procedure Act allows federal
courts to certify questions of state law directly to the Washington Supreme Court when no state decision
has interpreted the point of law at issue. WASH. REv. CODE § 2.60.010-.900 (1985). Once the
Washington Supreme Court receives the question, it permits the parties involved to submit briefs and
request oral arguments. WASH. REV. CODE § 2.60.030(4)-(5) (1985). See also UNIF. CERTIFICATION OF
QUESTIONS OF LAW AcT, 12 U.L.A. 52 (1975). By permitting the parties to submit briefs and request oral
arguments, the statute ensures that the question certified is presented in a concrete factual setting.
Comment, Certification Statutes: Engineering a Solution to Pullman Abstention Delay, 59 NOTRE
DAME LAW. 1339, 1356 (1984). The Washington Supreme Court has expressed its eagerness to receive
certified questions. See Purse Seine Vessel Owners Ass'n v. Moos, 88 Wn. 2d 799,567 P.2d 205 (1977)
(federal district court should have sought interpretation of state statute through certification procedure).
1241
Washington Law Review
unsettled state law directly to the state's highest court for clarification. 35
Although the federal court still decides the federal constitutional questions
presented, certification allows the state's highest court to construe au-
thoritatively its own law prior to federal court adjudication of the federal
constitutional issues. 36 The federal court normally initiates certification
procedures after oral argument on the merits of the case. 37 The certifying
court prepares a certification order to be forwarded to the state supreme
court. 38 The federal court retains jurisdiction but suspends proceedings
until it receives a reply from the state supreme court. While theoretically a
form of abstention, 39 certification produces a definitive state court con-
struction of state law with considerably less delay and expense than
abstention requires. 40
B. Identifying and Regulating Obscenity
1. The Supreme Court Standard
In Roth v. United States,41 the Supreme Court first considered the
constitutional implications of state obscenity regulation. The Court first
reasoned that the framers of the Bill of Rights wrote the first amendment to
protect the free exchange of ideas of social and political importance. 42 The
Roth Court further held that obscenity by definition is utterly without such
redeeming social importance, and that the first amendment does not protect
legally obscene material. 43 The states, then, were free to enact legislation
to regulate obscenity.44 The Roth Court carefully defined legal obscenity as
35. See Field, supra note 23, at 605; Comment, supra note 34, at 1349.
36. 17 WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 14, § 4248, at 529-30.
37. Id. at 530; C. SERON, CERTIFYING QUESTIONS OF STATE LAW: EXPERIENCE OF FEDERAL JUDGES 8
(Federal Judicial Center 1983). Although the parties are not barred from requesting certification, the
court is best situated to determine its own level of confidence in its interpretation of state law. 17 WRIGHT
& MILLER, supra note 14, § 4248, at 530.
38. See UNIF. CERTIFICATION OF QUESTIONS OF LAW ACT, 12 U.L.A. 52 (1975), upon which state
certification statutes generally are based. 17 WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 14, § 4248, at 525.
39. 17 WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 14, § 4241, at 441; Comment, supra note 34, at 1354.
40. Bellotti v. Baird, 428 U.S. 132, 150-51(1976); Lehman Bros. v. Schein, 416 U.S. 386,390-91
(1974); Comment, supra note 34, at 1349. While the certification procedure is frequently criticized
because of the delay it can cause, see, e.g., Mattis, Certification of Questions of State Law: An
Impractical Tool in the Hands of Federal Courts, 23 U. MIAMI L. REV. 717,725-27 (1969), certification
is less time-consuming and less costly than abstention. Field, supra note 23, at 605-06. A survey of
federal judges shows that the median time to obtain a state court answer to a certified question is only six
months, C. SERON, supra note 37, at 15, while abstention may cause a delay of many years. See supra
note 28.
41. 354 U.S. 476 (1957).
42. Roth, 354 U.S. at 484.
43. Id. at 485.
44. Id. at 484-85.
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material that the average person, applying contemporary community stan-
dards, would find appeals to the prurient interest, further specifying that
such material has a tendency to excite lustful thoughts. 45
The Supreme Court refined this definition of obscenity in Miller v.
California,46 restricting obscenity to works that: (1) depict or describe, in a
patently offensive way, sexual conduct specifically defined by the applica-
ble state law; and (2) lack serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific
value.47 The Miller Court emphasized that it would not propose regulatory
schemes for the states, 48 but cautioned that statutes designed to regulate
obscenity must be carefully limited in order not to impinge upon constitu-
tionally protected speech. 49 The Court stated that the regulations, either as
written or construed, must not run afoul of the specific guidelines set forth
in Miller. 50
2. Washington Legislation
In 1982, the Washington state legislature enacted a dual system of civil
and criminal penalities for those who deal in obscenity or prostitution. 51
The statute declared any place selling "lewd matter" to be a "moral
45. Id. at 487 n.20, 489. The Court defined "material which deals with sex in a manner appealing
to prurient interest" as:
I.e., material having a tendency to excite lustful thoughts. Webster's New International
Dictionary (Unabridged, 2d ed., 1949) defines prurient, in pertinent part, as follows:
"...Itching; longing; uneasy with desire or longing; of persons, having itching, morbid, or
lascivious longings; of desire, curiosity, or propensity, lewd.
Pruriency is defined, in pertinent part, as follows:
"... Quality of being prurient; lascivious desire or thought.
We perceive no significant difference between the meaning of obscenity developed in the case
law and the definition of the A.L.I., Model Penal Code, § 207.10(2) (Tent. Draft No. 6, 1957),
viz.:
"... A thing is obscene if, considered as a whole, its predominant appeal is to prurient
interest, i.e., a shameful or morbid interest in nudity, sex, or excretion, and if it goes substantially
beyond customary limits of candor in description or representation of such matters.
Id. at 487 n.20.
46. 413 U.S. 15 (1973).
47. MIller, 413 U.S. at 24. The Miller Court did not attempt to further define "prurient" as used in
the Roth Court's definition and expressed doubt as to whether a single definition of "prurient" was
desirable or possible. Id. at 30. See supra note 51.
48. Miller, 413 U.S. at 25.
49. Id. at 23-24.
50. Id. at 25. The Court has noted that the construction of state obscenity legislation is to be left to
the state courts. Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. 87, 113 (1974) ("[W]e must leave to state courts the
construction of state legislation . ) (quoting United States v. 12 200-ft. Reels of Super 8mm.
Film, 413 U.S. 123, 130 n.7 (1973)).
51. WASH. REv. CODE § 7.48A.010-.900 (1985). An earlier moral nuisance law, adopted as an
initiative measure in 1977, had been struck down as an impermissible prior restraint. See Spokane
Arcades, Inc. v. Brockett, 631 F.2d 135 (9th Cir. 1980), aff'd, 454 U.S. 1022 (1981).
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nuisance. ", 52 It further equated "lewd matter" with "obscene matter. ", 53 It
then defined these terms as any matter that: (1) lacks serious literary,
artistic, political, or scientific value when considered as a whole and in the
context in which it is used; (2) explicitly details patently offensive represen-
tations of specific sexual conduct; and (3) the average person, applying
contemporary community standards, would find appeals to the prurient
interest when considered as a whole.54 The legislature defined "prurient"
as "that which incites lasciviousness or lust." 55 The statute did not further
define the word "lust." Although an earlier Washington Supreme Court
decision had established the court's willingness to interpret state obscenity
regulations in conformity with the Miller guidelines, 56 the Washington
courts had not had an opportunity to construe the word "lust" as used in the
statute when opponents of the statute challenged it in federal district court.
II. THE FACTS AND HOLDINGS OF BROCKETT
In Brockett v. Spokane Arcades, Inc., sellers of sexually explicit materi-
al challenged the constitutionality of the newly enacted Washington moral
nuisance statute in federal district court. 57 Plaintiffs argued that the inclu-
sion of "lust" in the statutory definition of "prurient" rendered the statute
unconstitutionally overbroad. 58 They asserted that "lust" reached material
that aroused only a normal interest in sex. 59 Declaring abstention inap-
propriate in first amendment cases because of the delay, 60 the district court
reached the merits and upheld the constitutionality of the statute. 61
52. WASH. REV. CODE § 7.48A.020(l)-(4) (1985).
53. Id. § 7.48A.010(2).
54. Id. § 7.48A.010(2)(a)-(c).
55. Id. § 7.48A.010(8). The majority of state obscenity statutes leave the word "prurient"
undefined, although some define it as "shameful or morbid." Brockett, 105 S. Ct. at 2803 n. 13. The
only exceptions are Washington, New Hampshire (defining a "prurient interest" as an "interest in
lewdness or lascivious thoughts"), id., and Mississippi (defining "prurient" as "a lustful, erotic,
shameful, or morbid interest in nudity, sex, or excretion"). Id. Enforcement of the Mississippi statute
has been enjoined, because, inter alia, the inclusion of the word "lust" would permit the statute to reach
protected materials. Goldstein v. Allain, 568 F. Supp. 1377, 1385 (N.D. Miss. 1983), appeal stayed
pending trial on the merits, No. 83-4452 (5th Cir. June 20, 1984).
56. See State v. J-R Distribs., Inc., 82 Wn. 2d 584, 512 P.2d 1049 (1973) (reevaluating language in
obscenity opinion to conform with Miller), cert. denied, 418 U.S. 949 (1974).
57. Spokane Arcades, Inc. v. Eikenberry, 544 F. Supp. 1034 (E.D. Wash. 1982), rev'd sub nom.
J-R Distribs., Inc. v. Eikenberry, 725 F.2d 482 (9th Cir. 1984), rev'd sub nom. Brockett v. Spokane
Arcades, Inc., 105 S. Ct. 2794 (1985).
58. Spokane Arcades, 544 F. Supp. at 1038. Plaintiffs also argued that the word "lust" should be
voided for vagueness. Id. However, the ultimate disposition of the case did not turn on this argument.
59. Id. Plaintiffs alleged that the word "prurient" has a more circumscribed meaning and pointed
to case law noting in dicta that prurient interest entails a shameful or morbid interest in nudity, sex, or
excretion. Id.
60. Id. at 1037.
61. Id. at 1049.
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The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed. 62 Although the court
agreed that abstention was inappropriate, 63 it disagreed with the lower
court's resolution of the merits. Although the Roth Court had defined
"prurient" in terms of lust in 1957, the appellate court concluded that the
word "lust" was now understood as referring to a healthy, normal human
reaction rather than to any shameful or morbid appetite. 64 Thus, the court
held that the inclusion of the word "lust" in the definition of "prurient"
allowed the Washington moral nuisance statute to reach constitutionally
protected materials. 65 The Ninth Circuit reasoned that any application of
the statute would rest upon a determination of obscenity by reference to the
unconstitutionally overbroad definition, 66 and therefore the court invali-
dated the statute in its entirety.67
The Supreme Court reversed and remanded. 68 Without definitively con-
struing "lust," the Supreme Court held that the statute should have been
invalidated only insofar as the word "lust" includes a normal interest in
sex. 69 Chief Justice Burger and Justices Rehnquist and O'Connor con-
curred on the grounds that the federal courts should have abstained and
allowed the Washington courts an opportunity to construe the state law.70
The concurring justices contended that the Ninth Circuit's conclusion that
the statute reached expression protected by the first amendment rested on a
strained interpretation of the word "lust." ' 7 1 These justices found the
decision of the court of appeals to be a premature interference with the
enforcement of state law, especially since the Washington Supreme Court
was agreeable to accepting certified questions from the federal courts. 72
62. J-R Distribs., Inc. v. Eikenberry, 725 F.2d 482,496(9th Cir. 1984), rev'dsub nom. Brockettv.
Spokane Arcades, Inc., 105 S. Ct. 2794 (1985).
63. 725 F.2d at 488.
64. Id. at 491. The court relied on a recent edition of Webster's New International Dictionary, an
interview with President Jimmy Carter published in Playboy magazine, the A.L.I.'s 1962 Offical Draft
of the Model Penal Code, and the dicta of other courts that had considered the issue. 725 F.2d at 490-91.
65. J-R Distribs., 725 F.2d at 491.
66. Id. at 493 n.11.
67. Id. at 496.
68. Brockett v. Spokane Arcades, Inc., 105 S. Ct. 2794, 2804 (1985).
69. Id. at 2800. The Court stated that "other things being equal" Brockett might not be a case for
deferring to the appellate court's interpretation of lust. Id. It also implied that plaintiffs' argument that
the meaning of lust had changed since Roth was questionable. Id. at 2800 n.10.
Although the Court's narrow overbreadth holding is significant, this Note does not address over-
breadth. Instead, it focuses on the alternatives available to the Court to resolve the threshold state law
question presented in Brockett.
70. Id. (O'Connor, J., concurring).
71. Id. at 2805.
72. Id. Justices Brennan and Marshall dissented because they felt that the Court had failed to
describe obscenity except by reference to vague concepts that lacked clear delineation between
protected and unprotected speech. Id. at 2805-06 (citing Paris Adult Theaters I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49
(1973) (Brennan, J., dissenting)).
1245
Washington Law Review
The Supreme Court instructed the Ninth Circuit to reconsider its facial
invalidation of the Washington moral nuisance statute. 73 On remand, the
parties reached a settlement which called for striking the statute's definition
of "prurient," leaving the term undefined. 74 Thus, the proper interpretation
of the word "lust" as used in the statute is now moot.
III. ANSWERING A QUESTION WITH A QUESTION
The federal courts litigated the threshold question in Brockett for nearly
four years without ever conclusively determining the proper interpretation
of the word "lust" as used in the Washington moral nuisance statute.
Ironically, the lower federal courts had declined to abstain on the ground
that such a procedure would impermissibly delay the adjudication. 75 Nei-
ther the district nor the appellate court explicitly considered certifying the
state law question. Certification, however, represents an efficient means for
allowing state courts to construe their own laws, avoiding both the exces-
sive delays and expenses of abstention and the risks of federal court
speculation on unresolved state law.
A. Solutions of the Majority and the Concurrence
The Supreme Court majority opinion in Brockett compounded the error
of the lower federal courts by continuing to refuse to allow the Washington
state courts the first opportunity to construe their own statute. 76 A federal
statutory interpretation of Washington's use of the word "lust" creates a
precedent of limited applicability7 7 and delays the conclusive resolution of
the issue by the state courts. 78 In contrast, a state court decision on the issue
73. Brockett, 105 S.Ct. at 2804.
74. Press Release from Kenneth 0. Eikenberry, Attorney General of the State of Washington (Mar.
14, 1986) (copy on file with the Washington Law Review).
75. J-R Distribs., Inc. v. Eikenberry, 725 F.2d 482, 488 (9th Cir. 1984); Spokane Arcades, Inc. v.
Eikenberry, 544 F. Supp. 1034, 1037 (E.D. Wash. 1982).
76. In Reetz v. Bozanich, 397 U.S. 82 (1970), the Supreme Court stated that the proper exercise of
federal jurisdiction requires unsettled questions of state law to be decided in state courts prior to federal
court consideration of the underlying federal constitutional issues. Id. at 85 (citing City of Meridian v.
Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 358 U.S. 639, 640-41 (1959)). Mere lack of clarity as to the state law,
however, is usually not held to be sufficient to trigger abstention. See M. REDISH, supra note 18, at 235.
77. Federal interpretations of state law may be later overruled by state supreme court decisions. See
MOORE, supra note 18, § 309[2], at 3123 n. 19; Note, State Law in Federal Courts: The Implications of
De Novo Review, 60 WASH. L. REv. 739, 747 (1985).
78. See Wright, supra note 18, at 322-23 (1967); Note, supra note 77, at 749 n.72. When a state
statute is obviously unconstitutional if read one way and is constitutional if read another, state courts are
likely to adopt the constitutional interpretation. Field, supra note 18, at 1117. The clear unconstitu-
tionality of one interpretation may justify the federal court determination that the state court would
adopt the constitutional interpretation. Id. A state court, however, may well choose to strain the
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would have furthered the evolution of state law and policy by providing a
nonspeculative interpretation of the unclear law.79 In addition, the regula-
tion of obscenity is a particularly sensitive area of state law.80 The Supreme
Court in Brockett, therefore, should have allowed the Washington Supreme
Court to decide the threshold state law question.
The concurrence recommended abstention under Pullman.81 Although
this course of action would avoid the risk of federal court error in deciding
state law questions, it is an inefficient way to resolve the threshold question
in Brockett. The litigants, perceiving the added delay and expense of
abstention, might have submitted all issues to the state court for determina-
tion in order to save what time and costs they might. They would have thus
waived their right to litigate the federal constitutional issues in federal
court,82 arguably the forum with more expertise. In addition, the expecta-
tion of a consistent policy of abstention might deter future litigants from
pursuing their right to a federal forum from the outset if they know they will
inevitably be bounced back to the state court. 83 Discouraging access to the
federal courts is particularly inappropriate when plaintiffs wish to litigate
federal constitutional rights.84 Thus, the practical consequences of
Pullman abstention make it generally unacceptable in first amendment
cases.
85
B. Certification Procedures
The threshold question in Brockett could have been resolved most
expeditiously by certifying a question to the Washington Supreme Court on
the proper interpretation of the word "lust" as used in the Washington
moral nuisance statute. Had the court limited the word "lust" to behavior of
meaning of the statute in order to preserve the constitutionality of the seemingly unconstitutional
construction. Id. Therefore, even if a federal court is certain that the state courts will construe a
challenged state statute so as to preserve its constitutionality, it may justifiably conclude that the state
judiciary instead of the federal should make that determination. Id. at 1118.
79. Note, supra note 77, at 749 n.72.
80. See Red Bluff Drive-In, Inc. v. Vance, 648 F.2d 1020, 1035 (5th Cir. 1981). Brockett, however,
may signal a disinclination of the Supreme Court to retreat from control over state obscenity regula-
tions.
81. Throughout her opinion, Justice O'Connor referred only to abstention, but in the final
paragraph stated that a federal court decision in this case was particularly gratuitous when a certification
procedure was available. Brockett v. Spokane Arcades, Inc., 105 S. Ct. 2794, 2805 (1985) (O'Connor,
J., concurring).
82. Litigants usually do forego their right to return to the federal forum. Ryckman, Land Use
Litigation, Federal Jurisdiction, and the Abstention Doctrines, 69 CALiF. L. REv. 377, 405 n. 157
(1981); Field, supra note 23, at 591.
83. Field, supra note 23, at 591; Field, supra note 18, at 1087.
84. Field, supra note 23, at 591. See Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225, 242 (1972).
85. See supra text accompanying note 32.
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a nonprotected nature, the federal constitutional challenges would have
been moot. If the Washington Supreme Court had held that "lust" included
behavior that a federal court later found to be protected, the federal court
would have at least addressed the federal constitutional issues without
basing its decision on guesswork.
Certification, of course, serves no purpose if the state supreme court
refuses to answer the proffered question. The Washington Supreme Court
possesses both the procedural authority and the policy underpinnings to
enhance the chances of certification acceptance. The Washington Constitu-
tion empowers the Washington Supreme Court to accept a broad range of
certified questions, including definitional questions. 86 Although the court,
in an unpublished opinion, has refused a certified question because the
question ultimately involved a federal constitutional question, 87 the issue to
be certified in Brockett need not present a constitutional question. The
question could have read: How does the Washington Supreme Court
construe the word "lust" as used in section 7.48A.010(8) of the Revised
Code of Washington? Such a question would not directly entail a Washing-
ton Supreme Court ruling on the statute's constitutionality under the first
amendment. Rather it would require a construction of state law, indepen-
dent of any federal law on the issue. 88
Even if the federal courts had asked for a federal constitutional deter-
mination, however, the Washington Supreme Court no longer seems to
follow the "ultimately federal constitutional question" restriction.8 9 In-
deed, the Washington Supreme Court has sought to encourage federal
86. See In re Elliot, 74 Wn. 2d 600, 617, 446 P.2d 347, 358 (1968); e.g., Hart v. Peoples Nat'l
Bank, 91 Wn. 2d 197, 588 P.2d 204 (1978).
87. Elliot, 74 Wn. 2d at 617-18, 446 P.2d at 358 (referring to Thiry v. Atlantic Monthly Co., 74
Wn. 2d 679,445 P.2d 1012 (1968)). This portion of the Thiry opinion was not published, nor did Elliot
clearly explain the earlier case's factual or legal posture. Although the Elliot opinion did not refer to the
Thirv opinion by name, only two certified questions were directed to the Washington Supreme Court
during this time period.
88. Presumably, however, the Washington Supreme Court would want to construe the statute as
broadly as the language permits, yet consistently with the constitutional guidelines set forth in Miller.
Although federal constitutional questions are not to be certified, the parties should discuss them in their
presentation to the state court, so that the state court may decide the state question in light of the federal
constitutional concerns. 17 WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 14, § 4248, at 530.
89. See, e.g., Macumber v. Shafer, 96 Wn. 2d 568, 637 P.2d 645 (1981) (Washington Supreme
Court answered a certified question that required determination of constitutionality under article 1,
section 10 of the United States Constitution); United States v. 1216.83 Acres of Land, 89 Wn. 2d 550,
574 P.2d 375 (1978) (Washington Supreme Court answered a certified question on the constitutionality
of Washington state officals' actions under the federal Migratory Bird Conservation Act, 16 U.S.C.
§ 715k-5 (1967)). But see WASH. R. App. P. 16.16(a) (Washington Supreme Court may not accept a
certified question that involves "a question determined by reference to the United States Constitu-
tion. ").
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courts to use the certification process to clarify issues of state law in federal
constitutional cases. 90
For the sake of judicial economy, certification should have occurred at
the district court level of the Brockett litigation. 91 However, certification at
any stage in the litigation would have been preferable to speculative
adjudication on the threshold state law question in Brockett.
IV. SUGGESTED MODIFICATIONS OF THE CERTIFICATION
PROCEDURE
To make certification a more attractive method to resolve state law
questions in federal constitutional cases, courts such as the Washington
Supreme Court should implement procedures to reduce delays inherent in
the certification process. The court could adopt a docketing system that
gives first priority to certified question cases in which delay presents a
significant threat to the exercise of constitutional rights. 92 Alternatively,
the court could establish a policy of granting docket priority in any case in
which the federal court requests expediency. 93 Although the final decision
90. See, e.g., Purse Seine Vessel Owners Ass'n v. Moos, 88 Wn. 2d 799, 806, 567 P.2d 205, 209
(1977) (certification procedure provides a simple and practical way for federal court to seek answers to
state law questions and avoid federal and state court conflict).
Not all states are as receptive to certified questions as is Washington. The Georgia Supreme Court,
for example, refused a certified question that sought the definition of terms in a statute governing the
display and distribution of sexually explicit materials to minors. American Booksellers Ass'n v. Webb,
254 Ga. 399, 329 S.E.2d 495, 498 (1985). The plaintiffs had advanced various hypothethical fact
patterns in a declaratory judgment action and had requested interpretation of the statute's application in
each context. Id. at 498. The Georgia Supreme Court found that no facts were presented to create an
actual controversy and declined to answer on the grounds that the question was anticipatory. Id.
Under the Washington constitution, however, the absence of an actual controversy would not prevent
the court from answering a certified question. In re Elliot, 74 Wn. 2d 600, 611-12, 446 P.2d 347, 355
(1968). Furthermore, the Washington Supreme Court reasons that certified questions do not call for
advisory or anticipatory opinions. Id. at 610-11, 446 P.2d at 354.
91. The Washington Supreme Court will accept a certified question from any of the federal courts.
WASH. REv. CODE § 2.60.020 (1985). Although all states that have certification statutes or court rules
allow certification from the United States Supreme Court and federal courts of appeals, not all states
permit questions from federal district courts or other federal courts. 17 WRIGHT & MLER supra note
14, § 4248, at 525; Comment, supra note 34, at 1349.
92. The Washington certification statute allows the supreme court to adopt procedures and rules of
practice that will facilitate the use of the certification procedure. WASH. REv. CODE § 2.60.030(7)
(1985).
93. Washington currently has no statutory provision granting certified questions docket priority.
However, the supreme court may accelerate the disposition of any review proceeding on the court's
motion calendar. See WASH. R. ApP. P. 18.12. State courts should expect adequate reasons from
certifying federal courts for expediency requests to ensure that the privilege will not be abused. See
Thiry v. Atlantic Monthly Co., 74 Wn. 2d 679,445 P.2d 1012 (1968) (Hale, L, dissenting) (noting that
the district court's request to act "quickly and expeditiously" was unsupported). Because certification
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to grant docket priority would rest with the court, federal courts could
earmark certified questions deserving immediate attention. By granting
docket priority to appropriate certified questions, the court would encour-
age federal courts to certify questions of state law in cases involving federal
constitutional questions. 94
In addition, federal courts could fashion their certification orders to
mitigate the dangers of delay. In certifying a question, a federal court could
set a specific date upon which to resume the litigation and reconsider the
state issue in question, specifying that the answer to the certified question
will be incorporated into the decision at that time.95 The parties would be
instructed to return to federal court on that date to proceed with the federal
litigation, regardless of whether an answer from the state court is forthcom-
ing. 96 By adjusting the certification order to the case before it, a federal
court could permit the state court the opportunity to address state law
questions without sacrificing the need for expediency in federal constitu-
tional cases.
A federal court could also mitigate against the chilling of first amend-
ment rights during the period of certification by granting interim relief.
Federal courts could enjoin the enforcement of a challenged statute, either
in whole or in part, until they determine its constitutionality. 97 Such interim
relief would reduce the risks of certification without foregoing its bene-
fits. 98
of state law questions benefits state courts as well as federal courts, state courts should heed federal
courts' requests for expediency.
94. Comment, supra note 34, at 1349. While such a policy will encourage the federal courts to
certify a wider range of cases to the state court, federal judges are unlikely to abuse the privilege by
certifying large numbers of questions. In re Elliot, 74 Wn. 2d 600, 617, 446 P.2d 347, 358 (1968):
Comment, supra note 34. at 1358-59.
95. See Badham v. United States Dist. Court, 721 F.2d 1170, 1174 (9th Cir. 1983). Because state
courts require a median of six months to formulate a response to a certified question, C. SERON, supra
note 37. at 15, federal courts should allow at least six months time before the parties return to federal
court. The state court, however, might legitimately need more time than the federal court has allowed.
In this instance, the state court should be permitted to request a continuance of the federal court
litigation. A continuance should be granted by the federal court whenever reasonable out of respect for
the state court and in the interests of avoiding constitutional adjudication.
96. Although such a procedure pressures the state court to consider the certified question before the
date specified in the certification order, the state court would not be required to answer the question. See
In re Elliot, 74 Wn. 2d 600, 610, 446 P.2d 347, 354 (1968) (Washington certification statute is
permissive and not mandatory). When presented with a certified question subject to an immediate
deadline, the state court could weigh the state interests in deciding the issue against the time pressures
imposed in determining whether to accomodate the certified question.
97. See American Booksellers Ass'n v. Webb, 590 F. Supp. 677. 687 (N.D. Ga. 1984) (granting a
partial injunction of an obscenity statute during the interim period of abstention).
98. Wells, supra note 3, at 80.
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Interim injunctive relief has been criticized as inconsistent with the
doctrine of federalism underlying both abstention and certification, 99 be-
cause it necessarily entails a federal court interfering with a state's pro-
gram. 100 However, a federal court that couples its certification order with an
injunction interferes less with state interests and programs than does a court
that fails to certify a state law question in an appropriate case. 101
Where the federal court's certification order limits the time by which the
state court must answer the certified question, the preliminary injunction
will be correspondingly limited. Because the state supreme court presum-
ably recognizes the harm caused to the state by the delay in enforcement of
the statute occasioned by interim injunctive relief, it will act with all
possible speed to further minimize the delay. 102 Once the state court issues
its response to the certified question, the federal court could modify or lift
the injunction. 103 The state incurs much greater harm from inaccurate
99. Id. at 75.
100. Id. A grant of interim relief rests in part upon the federal court's evaluation of the merits of the
plaintiff's case. Id. at 68. To the extent that even a tentative constitutional determination interferes with
the operation of a state program, the underlying principle that state courts should decide issues of state
law seems to be abrogated. Id. at 68-69. The harm, however, is less than that inflicted when a federal
court declines to seek state court input. Id. at 68. Moreover, if the harm to the plaintiff absent interim
relief would be substantial and the hardship to the defendant minimal, a federal court may grant interim
relief without deciding the likelihood of the plaintiff's success on the merits, providing that the plaintiff
has raised substantial questions presenting legitimate grounds for litigation. Id. at 70.
101. Cf. Wells, supra note 3, at7l (applying this rationale to abstention cases). Moreover, a federal
court's refusal to certify or abstain does not preclude an injunction against enforcement of the
controverted statute during the pendency of the federal litigation. Although the federal courts in
Brockett refused to certify or abstain on the state law question, the enforcement of the Washington
moral nuisance statute has nonetheless been enjoined throughout the entire four-year period of
litigation on the threshold state law question. Press Release from Kenneth 0. Eikenberry, Attorney
General of the State of Washington (Mar. 14, 1986) (copy on file with the Washington Law Review).
Surely this is more of an intrusion upon state interests than an injunction of approximately six months
duration issued in order for the state supreme court to resolve definitively the statutory question.
102. Wells, supra note 3, at 71.
103. See FED. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(5) (court may relieve party from judgment or order when "it is no
longer equitable that the judgment should have prospective application"); Lee v. Bickell, 292 U.S. 415,
425-26 (1934). See generally Note, Finality of Equity Decrees in the Light of Subsequent Events, 59
HARV. L. REV. 957, 963-66 (1946).
Normally, the definitional component of a statute cannot be enjoined without also enjoining
enforcement of the entire statute. American Booksellers Ass'n v. Webb, 590 F. Supp. 677, 687 (N.D.
Ga. 1984). However, the fact that the challenged portion of the statute was in a definitional segment
would not prevent partial enjoinment in Brockett since "lust" was only one of two words used to define
"prurient." WASH. REv. CODE § 7.48A.010(8) (1982). Thus, the federal court could enjoin enforce-
ment only as to "lust" while allowing the statute to stand utilizing the term "prurient." See American
Booksellers Ass'n, 590 F. Supp. at 687 ("[S]o long as a discrete provision of a challenged act may be
given legal effect standing alone, and it does not plainly appear that its separate enforcement would be
wholly contrary to the intent of the state legislature, the provision should be viewed separately for
purposes of determining the propriety of interim relief during the period of abstention.").
However, the Washington moral nuisance statute was also challenged on the grounds that the statute's
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construction of the statute than from interim relief, which merely causes
delay in achieving the state's objective and not total frustration of the
objective itself. 104
V. CONCLUSION
Ideally, the threshold state law question in Brockett should have been
resolved through the use of certification. The federal district court should
have certified a question to the Washington Supreme Court on the proper
interpretation of the word "lust" as used in the Washington moral nuisance
statute, requesting and giving reasons for expediency. The certification
order should have limited the time for response, so that the federal litigation
would not be indefinitely stayed if the Washington Supreme Court failed to
honor the request for expediency.
The federal court also should have enjoined enforcement of the statute
for the time period specified in the certification order, premising its injunc-
tion upon the parties' good faith effort to litigate expeditiously the certified
issue before the Washington Supreme Court. Granting interim relief and
fashioning the certification order so as to minimize delay, the federal court
could have simultaneously promoted accuracy in the determination of state
law and avoided chilling of first amendment rights.
Amy L. Swingen
penalty provisions unconstitutionally restricted first amendment rights of expression and that the
sanctions imposed by the statute violated the eighth amendment's prohibition against cruel and unusual
punishment. Spokane Arcades, Inc. v. Eikenberry, 544 F. Supp. 1034, 1037 (E.D. Wa. 1982). Thus,
this particular statute could not be enjoined only as to the challenged portion of the prurient definition.
104. Cf. Wells, supra note 3, at 71.
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